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DEALING WITH DUBIOUS CONTRACTS FOR CONVEYING LAND 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR REFORMATION FOR MUTUAL 
MISTAKE? 
 
William P. Pearce 
 
The topic of this Article arose from a recent opinion by the 
North Dakota Supreme Court: Western Energy Corporation v. 
Stauffer.1 The case dealt with how the law handles changes in 
ownership of property, specifically land including underlying mineral 
interests, that come into dispute after substantial periods of time have 
passed, resulting in a need for the parties involved in the dispute to 
turn to the courts for a solution. The passing of a substantial amount 
of time often becomes the issue in resolving the dispute in these types 
of situations. 
The opening paragraph in the Court’s opinion in Western 
Energy states that “Western Energy appealed from a district court 




 1. 921 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2019). 
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interests to be barred by applicable statutes of limitation and laches.” 
Statutes of limitation are fairly straightforward and are discussed 
below as they are the determinative factor in the case. However, the 
specific goal here is to examine several of the approaches that can be 
taken in this kind of situation and how the issue is ultimately resolved. 
Raising the claim of “laches” is a rather vague concept, but it appears 
in some of these cases and has an interesting background, as discussed 
in the last part of this Article. The background of the case in question 
will be laid out first followed by the discussion of several traditional 
methodologies for resolving cases of this kind, generally, in the 
context of other court cases.  
 
I. WESTERN ENERGY CORPORATION V. STAUFFER 
 
On May 25, 1959, members of the Eckman family, owners of 
a tract of land, agreed to convey a portion of their real property to 
members of the Stauffer family using a typical contract for deed to 
accomplish the transfer. The contract for deed contained a reservation 
of the underground oil, gas, and other minerals in the property in 
question, which is not an unusual practice in the western part of North 
Dakota where there are large underground deposits of these minerals. 
The contract for deed was on a five-year payment plan, after which the 
Eckmans were to convey the tract to the Stauffers by a warranty deed, 
the usual document used for completing the transfer of land. The 
actual conveyance of the property by the warranty deed was made very 
early, in June 1959, rather than on a five-year plan, but the timing is 
not particularly relevant to the case. However, the source of the 
ensuing problem was that the June 1959 warranty deed did not contain 
any reservations of minerals, although it expressly stated that the deed 
was given “in fulfillment of the contract for deed issued on the 25th of 
May 1959.”2 
At this point, a potential problem came into existence because 
there was an uncertainty regarding the status of the mineral interest. 
The apparent agreement between the Eckmans and the Stauffers was 
that 50% of the minerals were to be reserved, meaning they would not 
be included in the grant of the land made by the warranty deed. The 
statement that the warranty deed from the Eckmans to the Stauffers 
 
 2. Id. at 433. 
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was made in fulfillment of the contract for deed appears to support the 
passing of the mineral interests as well as the surface of the land, since 
there was no actual reservation of minerals in the deed itself. Under 
North Dakota statutory law, a conveyance of mineral rights in real 
property grants all minerals except those specifically excluded by 
name: 
 
All conveyances of mineral rights or royalties in real 
property in this state, excluding leases, shall be 
construed to grant or convey to the grantee thereof all 
minerals of any nature whatsoever except those 
minerals specifically excluded by name in the deed, 
grant, or conveyance, and their compounds and 
byproducts.3 
 
Since the warranty deed did not contain any mineral 
reservation, or apparently any reference to mineral interests, it appears 
to have conveyed all of the mineral interests in the tract in question to 
the Stauffers. A conveyance of land that does not explicitly include a 
reservation of minerals automatically includes the minerals that are a 
part of the land unless there has been an intentional severance of 
minerals from the land. Since the Eckmans did not include any such 
reservation or severance of minerals in their warranty deed to the 
Stauffers, the land with the minerals passed to the Stauffers. This 
result has been clearly stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
following the established rule that a grant without a reservation shall 
be interpreted in favor of the grantee, and “[a] conveyance of land, 
without any exception or reservation of minerals constitutes a 
conveyance of 100 percent of the minerals as well as the surface.4 
A quiet title action was filed by Western Energy Corporation 
in 2016 against a number of successors of the Stauffers. The Court’s 
opinion does not does not specify the detailed basis for the quiet title 
action, but apparently numerous conveyances, oil and gas leases, and 
similar transactions were carried out by both the Eckmans and the 
Stauffers and their successors between 1959 and 2016. Beginning in 
1978, the Eckmans apparently began entering into agreements 
 
 3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (2014). 
 4. Acoma Oil Corp. v Wilson, 471 N.W.2d 476, 482 (N.D. 1991) (citing Sibert 
v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 496 (N.D. 1984)). 
  
268 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
conveying mineral interests, which they may have believed they had 
retained and were entitled to when the warranty deed was delivered to 
the Stauffers. Western Energy Corporation entered the picture in 1989 
and 1990 by acquiring mineral interests, including mineral interests 
that were all or portions of the interests the Eckmans had failed to 
reserve in the June 1969 warranty deed. The Court does not specify 
the various mineral interests in detail.  However, the disputed mineral 
interests must be the basis for the quiet title action, since the only 
mineral interests that Western Energy would be seeking to obtain by 
quiet title action against the Stauffer successors would be the mineral 
interests that passed to the Stauffers via the original warranty deed that 
contained no mineral reservation. 
The Supreme Court opinion does not specify from whom these 
interests were derived, but presumably it would have been from some 
or all of the persons involved in the case in an effort to clarify the 
actual ownership of the mineral interests in the land in question. 
Although the action was nominally brought as a quiet title action,5 the 
Supreme Court points out that the relief requested was not for quiet 
title. Instead, it was actually for reformation of the warranty deed, 
presumably because the deed did not contain a reservation of minerals 
and was different from the original agreement.6 To successfully 
establish a basis for a reformation of the deed would require that there 
had been a sufficient mistake or mistakes to subsequently alter the 
terms of the deed. The district court concluded that the discrepancy 
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed itself was not 
sufficient to establish mutual mistake that could support a reformation. 
After several years, the situation had become more 
complicated, so a simple reformation by inserting a missing mineral 
reservation into the deed had become difficult, in view of all of the 
various transactions. The Supreme Court, on appeal from the district 
court, pointed out that numerous conveyances, oil and gas leases, and 
similar transactions were completed by both the Eckmans and 
Stauffers, as well as their successors in interest, during the period of 
time between the execution of the 1959 deed and the filing of the quiet 
title action in 2016. As stated above, the Eckmans conveyed mineral 
interests to others, perhaps even interests that they may have deemed 
 
 5. See Actions to Quiet Title and Determine Claims to Real Estate, N.D. CENT. 
CODE. § 32-17-1 et seq. (2010). 
 6. W. Energy Corp., 921 N.W.2d at 434. 
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they owned, based on the agreement for a mineral reservation in the 
contract for deed to the Stauffers. 
 In reality, the warranty deed should accomplish exactly what 
it says it intends to do. If there is no reservation of minerals stated in 
the deed, would that not mean that it was certain that no mineral 
reservation was intended? Despite the action being framed as a quiet 
title action, as noted above, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
recognized that the relief requested by Western Energy was actually 
to reform the warranty deed to comply with the original contract, 
which contained the reservation of minerals.7 So, the issue that forms 
the core of the case is: Does the law allow for changes, or corrections, 
to be made in 2016 in a warranty deed that was created and delivered 
in 1959? Not surprisingly, the answer in the Western Energy case was 
“no”. The point of this Article is to look at a few of the more common 
legal methods that may be used to attempt to seek a “yes” answer in a 
case of this kind. 
 
II. REFORMATION OF A DEED OR CONTRACT FOR MUTUAL MISTAKE 
 
The Western Energy quiet title action set the stage for 
establishing exactly who owns certain underlying mineral interests, 
presumably including those originally owned by the Eckmans, when 
there was no reservation in the warranty deed. This is the basic issue 
brought forth in a quiet title action, which is “a proceeding to establish 
the plaintiff’s title to land by bringing into court an adverse claimant 
and there compelling him either to establish his claim or be forever 
after estopped from asserting it.”8 Although the proceeding was 
brought as a quiet title action, the Court shows that the relief sought 
was actually to proceed with a reformation of the warranty deed. The 
theory behind reformation of a document is that in the course of 
creating it the parties inadvertently made a “mutual mistake.” If it can 
be proven that there was a mutual mistake, then there is a basis for a 
court to approve the document to be revised to correct the mistake. In 
other words, the court can order the reformation or correction of the 
original document to adapt it to the document that presumably was 
 
 7. See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis 
of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 265 (1998) (reformation of contracts). 
 8. Quiet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (4th ed. 1968). 
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intended to be created by the individuals who wrote it. Reformation of 
a written document is an appropriate result when the surrounding 
circumstances justify it. A court will grant relief by way of reformation 
of a written instrument resulting from a mutual mistake, but all of the 
circumstances must be taken into consideration: 
 
Each case involving the reformation of a contract 
on grounds of fraud or mutual mistake must be 
determined upon its own particular facts and 
circumstances. In considering whether or not a mutual 
mistake exists, the court can properly look into the 
surrounding circumstances and take into consideration 
all facts which disclose the intention of the parties.9 
 
If the facts and circumstances are sufficiently clear to justify the 
granting of a reformation of the document or documents in question, 
of course, the court would look favorably upon granting it, assuming 
that the case is not more appropriately handled by a statute of 
limitations, as in the Western Energy case.10 
The North Dakota statutory basis for approving reformation of a 
document is set out as follows: 
 
When, through fraud or mutual mistake of the 
parties, or a mistake of one party which the other at the 
time knew or suspected, a written contract does not 
truly express the intention of the parties, it may be 
revised on the application of a party aggrieved so as to 
express that intention so far as it can be done without 
prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good 
faith and for value.11 
 
The lower court was not convinced that the discrepancy between 
the warranty deed and the contract for deed—the reservation of the 
mineral interests—was sufficient to establish mutual mistake. Not 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s conclusion was the same simply 
 
 9. Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143, 150 (N.D. 1980). 
 10. See Zabolotny v. Fedorenko, 315 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1982) (holding that 
reformation was the most logical and appropriate resolution). 
 11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (2010).  
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because it would seem to have been peculiar and unlikely that the 
parties would have not have noticed in examining the recorded 
documents that there was a mineral reservation in the original contract 
for deed but nothing of that kind contained in the warranty deed. In 
fact, it seems relatively straightforward that the Stauffers ought to 
have acquired the mineral interest since they received a warranty deed 
that did not contain any mineral reservation and accordingly would 
necessarily have transferred all of the mineral interests. 
In addition to mutual mistake, it is possible in some cases for 
fraud of some kind to have occurred, but there appears to be no 
evidence of fraud having been a factor in the Western Energy case. 
However, there could always be something that occurs other than the 
sheer overlooking of some step in the process or transferring an 
interest in land, and the person bringing the claim has the burden to 
explain the problem. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has pointed 
out: 
 
A party seeking reformation has the burden to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that a written agreement 
does not fully or truly state the agreement the parties 
intended to make.12 The burden of proof rests on the 
party who seeks a reformation to prove that the written 
instrument does not fully or truly state the agreement 
that the parties intended to make.13 
 
Any case involving a claim for reformation of a document or 
documents must take into account all of the relevant facts in any given 
situation, meaning there is no standard scenario that will support a 
reformation. Included in the concept of “relevant facts” in modern 
times would be the possibility of introducing parol evidence, meaning 
oral evidence rather than written evidence, in support of a claim for 
reformation, but the standard for this is generally high: 
 
The Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of 
circumstantial parol evidence to prove mutual mistake 
 
 12. Dixon v. Dixon, 898 N.W.2d 706, 711 (N.D. 2017) (quoting Freidig v. Weed, 
868 N.W.2d 546, 549 (N.D. 2015)). 
 13. Ell, 295 N.W.2d at 150 (citing Oliver-Mercer Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. 
Fisher, 146 N.W.2d 346, 356 (N.D. 1966)). 
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is noteworthy here. Initially the Court acknowledged a 
high standard for use of parol evidence to prove mutual 
mistake: such evidence must be clear, satisfactory, 
specific, and convincing, and a court of equity will not 
grant reformation upon a mere preponderance of 
evidence, but only upon certainty of error.14 
 
Whether a mistake exists in a document that would have been 
sufficient to justify a claim of reformation involves looking at “each 
case involving the reformation of a contract on grounds of fraud or 
mutual mistake must be determined upon its own particular facts and 
circumstances.”15 
It should also be kept in mind when faced with a claim for 
reformation that it is not always a simple matter to determine whether 
there is a clear mistake in a contract: 
 
The inconsistency of the decisions as to the effect of 
mistake in contracting is due to the fact that Anglo-
American law is torn between the desire for stability of 
commercial transactions and the feeling that is it unfair 
to hold a party to a contract that he made without 
complete information about all the relevant 
circumstances. The latter consideration rests on a sense 
of fair play which looks with disfavor on permitting 
anyone to reap an advantage from another party’s 
mistakes.16 
 
Therefore, the essential basis for a successful action for 
reformation of a document is that it must be shown by substantial 
evidence that an actual mistake occurred in the creation of the 
document that is significant enough that the mutual intention of the 
parties to the document is not what was included in the document. As 
the Court stated in the Western Energy case: 
 
 14. Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, Recent Developments in North Dakota 
Contract Law, 92 N.D. L. REV. 19, 37 (2016). 
 15. Mau v. Schwan, 460 N.W.2d 131, 134 (N.D. 1990). 
 16. Ralph A. Newman, Relief for Mistake in Contracting, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 
232, 236–37 (1969). 
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Further, the district court concluded the discrepancy 
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed is 
not enough to establish mutual mistake. Because it 
found that Western had not met the burden of proof to 
establish mutual mistake at the time of conveyance, the 
district court entered judgment quieting title of the 
minerals to the Stauffers.17 
 
To establish the existence of a mistake that would be sufficiently 
important to justify a reformation of a document, the party claiming 
the existence of a genuine mistake must prove there was a firm basis 
for alleging the claim: 
 
Here, the district court found numerous transactions 
involving the property and mineral rights occurred in 
the decades since the warranty deed was executed and 
recorded. The district court found these transactions, 
including a completed title opinion, gave all parties 
reason to review the title record. An examination of the 
title record would have disclosed the difference 
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed. 
The district court thus concluded that any alleged 
mutual mistake was, or should have been, discovered 
with reasonable diligence in 1959 when the documents 
were executed, or in the intervening fifty-nine years 
since the execution of the warranty deed.…A simple 
examination of the title records would have revealed 
competing leases on the property as well as the 
discrepancy between the 1959 contract for deed and the 
warranty deed.18 
 
In Anderson v. Selby,19 the North Dakota Supreme Court also 
held that there was no basis for a reformation action in a somewhat 
similar situation to the one in Western Energy. The Andersons had 
conveyed a parcel of land, reserving oil, gas, and other minerals, and 
 
 17. W. Energy Corp. v. Stauffer, 921 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2019). 
 18. Id. at 435. 
 19. 700 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 2005). 
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they also intended to reserve a flowage easement. This easement was 
a right to raise the elevation of the water table in connection with a 
dam project in which the Andersons had offered the easement to the 
United States Army Corp of Engineers in charge of the project. 
However, the warranty deed from the Andersons to Selby did not 
contain a flowage easement. The Andersons, not wishing to lose the 
large payment they would have received from the Corps for the 
easement, sued Selby, seeking a reformation of the deed to include a 
reservation of the easement, which had not been included in the deed. 
Selby denied that there had been a mutual mistake regarding a 
reservation of the easement. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Selby on the Andersons’ claim, thereby declining 
to grant a reformation. On appeal by the Andersons, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to 
consider the matter: 
 
Although the Andersons have the ultimate burden of 
proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
they are entitled to reformation because of a mistake 
which Selby at the time knew or suspected, we believe 
there is evidence in this record which supports an 
inference that such a mistake was made. We therefore 
conclude summary judgment was not appropriate on 
the Andersons’ claim for reformation.20 
 
In other words, it was a matter of the two different courts 
viewing the evidence differently as to whether there could have been 
a mutual mistake that could have supported a reformation of the deed. 
 
III. WEHNER v. SCHROEDER: SOME SIMILARITIES TO WESTERN 
ENERGY BUT A DIFFERENT RESULT 
 
Another case, Wehner v. Schroeder,21 which was similar but 
different to the Western Energy case, came before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in 1984. The plaintiff sought reformation of a warranty 
 
 20. Id. at 701. 
 21. 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984). The earlier Wehner v. Schroeder case, 335 
N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983), ended in a remand which then led to the subsequent 1984 
case. 
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deed on the same grounds as in Western Energy—that a mineral 
reservation agreed upon in a contract for deed had been omitted from 
the subsequently recorded warranty deed. However, there was a 
peculiar quirk because the 1950 contract for deed stated that the 
“second parties,” the Schroeders, who were the grantees in the deed, 
“retain 50% of all oil, gas and minerals on said land.” The peculiarity 
is that the grantees were not the ones who were to retain the mineral 
interest since that was owned by the grantors [the Wehners], who 
would necessarily be the only persons who could be able to retain any 
of the minerals since they owned them. Both the contract for deed and 
the warranty deed had been recorded in 1950. Since that was done, the 
tract became the property of the Schroeders, but the 50% mineral 
interest was left somewhere in limbo because a contract for deed is not 
a grant and does not actually convey an interest in land but simply is 
a contractual promise to convey it via a warranty deed. 
In 1981, the Wehners brought an action to reform their 
warranty deed, stating that “second parties” was an error, and they 
intended to have “first parties,” meaning themselves as the grantors in 
the deed. They also asserted that the mineral reservation in the contract 
for deed was omitted from the warranty deed due to an “innocent 
mutual mistake” made by both of them and the Schroeders. Other 
parties had acquired some interests, but it is not necessary to look into 
that aspect. The district court found that a mutual mistake has been 
made between the Wehners and the Schroeders regarding the omission 
of the mineral reservation in the warranty deed, and this provided the 
basis for approving a reformation of the document. The question of 
reformation of a contract or other kind of document is often referred 
to as a matter for the “equity” courts, as mentioned later in this article: 
“A court of equity will grant relief by way of reformation of a written 
instrument, resulting from mutual mistake where justice and good 
conscience so dictate.”22 In affirming the grant of reformation from 
the district court in Wehner v. Schroeder, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court summarized as follows: 
 
We believe that in order to bar reformation under these 
particular circumstances, the fault of the party 
 
 22. Zabolotny v. Fedorenko, 315 N.W.2d 668, 671 (N.D. 1982) (citing Cokins 
v. Frandsen, 141 N.W.2d. 796, 798 (N.D. 1966)). 
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requesting relief must amount “to a failure to act in 
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards 
of fair dealing.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
157 (1981)….The trial court found no evidence that the 
Wehners failed to act in good faith or in accordance 
with reasonable standards of fair dealing. We have 
reviewed the record in this case and cannot say that the 
trial court erred in this regard. 
. . .  
The trial court found that a mutual mistake had 
occurred, and, as we stated earlier, that finding is not 
clearly erroneous. The doctrine of merger therefore 
does not bar reformation in this case.23 
 
In the law of real property, the doctrine of merger stands for 
the proposition that a contract for the conveyance of real property 
merges into the related deed of conveyance: 
 
One of the most firmly established common law 
doctrines governing real property involves the merger 
of rights stemming from a land sale contract into the 
deed that consummates the transaction…. In essence, 
because the deed is presumed to supersede all 
preceding negotiations and agreements, all rights and 
remedies of the parties in relation to the transaction 
must be determined by the deed. Most practitioners 
prepare real estate contracts with the belief that the 
doctrine will apply and merge the provisions of the 
contract in the deed.24 
Therefore, any guarantees made in the contract that are not 
reflected in the deed are extinguished when the deed is conveyed to 
the buyer of the property. In other words, the Court seems to be saying 
that the approved reformation in this case essentially blends the 
contract and the warranty into a single entity, which was appropriate 
in view of the approval of the claim for reformation. A number of other 
cases seeking reformation of documents have been brought over the 
 
 23. Wehner, 354 N.W.2d at 679. 
 24. Barry M. Goldman, Common Law Doctrine of Merger: The Exceptions are 
the Rule, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 19 (1983). 
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years before the North Dakota Supreme Court, and there is one 
opinion, granted in 1966, which seems particularly lucid in dealing 
with this issue. In Cokins v. Frandsen, the issue arose when a buyer 
and a seller entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of a 
real estate tract on which a restaurant was located. In the course of an 
engineering survey it was discovered that the description of the tract 
in the agreement was erroneous. The buyers brought an action for 
reformation to correct the instrument. At the outset, the Court stated 
clearly the basic situation required in order for reformation to take 
place: 
 
In order that the court may order reformation of the 
description of real estate in an instrument, it must 
appear that there has been a mutual mistake. In other 
words, it must be shown that, at the time of the 
execution of the agreement to sell, both parties 
intended to say something different from what was said 
in the instrument. In such event, equity has the power 
to reform the instrument to correct the mutual mistake 
of the parties.25 
 
The Court in Cokins, as opposed to some of the other cases, 
determined that a mutual mistake had been by both the buyer and the 
seller in drafting the purchase agreement, due to an error in the 
description of the tract of land in question. Accordingly, this was an 
appropriate case for the equitable relief of reformation: 
 
There being a mutual mistake in the description, such 
mutual mistake justifies the reformation of the 
description in the purchase agreement, and the 
judgment of the trial court granting reformation of the 
description in the purchase agreement and the deed is 
affirmed.26 
 
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATION: CLOSING THE GATE 
 
 25. Cokins v. Frandsen, 141 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D. 1966) (citing Williams v. 
Hebbard, 92 P.2d 657 (Cal. 1939)). 
 26. Id. at 800 (citing Wilson v. Pulsfut, 49 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1951)). 
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As discussed above, the attempt to alter the contract and 
warranty deed problem in the Western Energy quiet title action by 
reformation based on mutual mistake failed due to a lack of any basis 
for asserting a “mutual mistake.” The actual solution the district court 
used, and the North Dakota Supreme Court approved, was the Statute 
of Limitations. The extensive lapse of time during which there was no 
complaint from Western Energy Corporation simply shut the matter 
down insofar as seeking a reformation. As pointed out by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court at the opening of its opinion, Western Energy 
Corporation appealed from a district court judgment that found its 
quiet title action to have been barred by applicable statutes of 
limitation and laches, and the mineral interests at issue having been 
awarded to the Stauffers. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment 
was affirmed. 
The term “laches” used in the Court’s statement is discussed 
below. At this point, it is the statute of limitations that is the 
determining factor. The North Dakota statute of limitations pertaining 
to conveyances such as occurred in this case is N.D. Cent. Code Ann. 
§ 28-01-15, labeled in the code volume as “Actions having ten-year 
limitations.” There are several subsections to this statute, and the 
Court cites § 28-01-15(2), as the district court had also done, which 
provides that any legal action based on contracts or any other 
instruments affecting title to real property must be commenced within 
ten years following the time the claim for relief accrues. Accordingly, 
since a substantial number of years more than ten had passed from the 
delivery of the warranty deed in 1959 to the bringing of the quiet title 
action by Western Energy in 2016—57 years—there was clearly no 
question that the quiet title action must disappear, and the Stauffers 
finally became established as the owners of the mineral interest in 
question after what clearly appeared to be an extended period of 
uncertainty and confusion. 
The history of Statutes of Limitation is an interesting one. Such 
principles developed first under English law and, as with many other 
legal principles, gradually expanded to become parts of American law: 
 
The principle [statutes of limitation] was first adopted 
in English law in connection with actions for the 
recovery of real property. . ..The various States 
[American] possess their own statutes of limitation 
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which are modeled in the main upon the English but 
differ widely in their minor details.27 
 
In fact, it has been pointed out that the concept of statutes of 
limitation may actually be traced as far back as to ancient Greece, and 
the first one to appear pertaining to real property actions under English 
law was a 1487 statute enacted during the reign of King Henry VII. 
The first such English statute was adopted by American colonies 
before the 1776 Revolution and ultimately became the foundation of 
nearly all subsequent American statutes of limitation.28 
The statutes of limitation constitute a very useful factor in the 
American legal system and by no means are they intended to provide 
an easy way for courts to limit the number of cases that may be piling 
up on the dockets. They have a definite purpose, which is clearly 
reflected in the analysis and opinion of the Supreme Court in this case, 
as well as in the same result originally reached in the district court. 
The following summaries of the function and purpose of the statutes 
of limitation demonstrate the underpinning of the clearly appropriate 
result in this case: 
 
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society, 
and are favored in the law. They are found and 
approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. 
They promote repose by giving security and stability to 
human affairs; important public policy lies at their 
foundation. Thy stimulate … activity and punish 
negligence. While time is constantly destroying 
evidence of rights, they supply its place by a 
presumption which renders proof unnecessary. Mere 
delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a 
conclusive bar.29 
 
A good characterization for statutes of limitation is they 
provide a kind of repose, preventing dubious claims from possibly 
lingering forever in the judicial system: 
 
 27. Statute of limitations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed. 1953). 
 28. Tyler T. Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of 
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454 (1997). 
 29. Id. at 456 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)). 
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The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, enacted 
as a matter of public policy to fix a limit within which 
an action must be brought, or the obligation is 
presumed to have been paid, and is intended to run 
against those who are neglectful of their rights, and 
who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the 
enforcement thereof….These statutes are declared to 
be ‘among the most beneficial in our books’ ‘They rest 
upon sound policy, and  tend to the peace and welfare 
of society.’.…The underlying purpose of statutes of 
limitation is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of 
stale claims concerning which persons interested have 
been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution.30 
 
V. LACHES: AN OLD-TIMER IN LEGAL HISTORY BUT STILL ALIVE 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion in the Western 
Energy case discussed above opens with a reference to the district 
court judgment “finding its quiet title action to be barred by applicable 
statutes of limitation and laches.” The actual holding was the action 
was effectively barred by the statute of limitation. The word “laches” 
is an old term that evolved from Latin (“laxus”) and Old French 
(“laschesse”), meaning laxness, slackness, negligence, and the like, 
usually in the course of legal matters. Laches is embedded in the legal 
concept of “equity,” which has been described in a variety of ways. A 
typical legal description of equity is: 
 
In its broadest and most general signification, this term 
[equity] denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, 
justness, and right dealing—the rule of doing to all 
others as we desire them to do to us; or; as it is 
expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm 
nobody, to render to every man his due.”31 
 
 
 30. Id. (citing Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 326 (Cal. 1944)). 
 31. Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). (Justinian was, of 
course the Byzantine emperor from A.D. 527 to 565, who compiled the famous book 
of laws entitled the Justinian Code.). 
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Having defined “equity,” we can see how the concept of 
“laches” is embedded into the function of equity as an integral part of 
the legal process carried on by the courts: 
 
Generally speaking, laches is a defense in equity that 
stands for the proposition that a court will not find for 
the plaintiff if the plaintiff delayed in bringing the case, 
and that delay harmed the defendant…. Accordingly, 
laches has traditionally had two, or at most three, 
components—delay, a position change for the worse, 
and a loss of evidence.”32 
 
Unreasonable delay in bringing an action before a court is not the sole 
feature of laches but it establishes the fundamental basis of this 
concept insofar as it affects an opposing party: 
 
Laches is a delay or lapse of time in commencing an 
action that works a disadvantage or prejudice to the 
adverse party because of a change in conditions during 
the delay.33 
 
Laches does not arise from a delay or lapse of time 
alone, and in addition to the time element, the party 
against whom laches is sought to be invoked must be 
actually or presumptively aware of his rights and must 
fail to assert them against a party who in good faith 
permitted his position to become so changed that he 
could not be restored to his former state.34 
 
In the historical legal context, laches came to be appropriated 
by the English chancery courts, where decisions could be made by the 
judges that were more flexible than what would be required under the 
strict legal rules that had been established under the common law.35 
 
 32. Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 365 (2009). 
 33. Williams Cty. Soc. Servs. Bd. v. Falcon, 367 N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.D. 1985).  
 34. Burlington N., Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 242 (N.D. 1982). 
 35. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22 
(1989) (“Equity, however, had emerged in the colonies as a matter of practice, if not 
of form. Seventeenth century colonial lay judges exercised a kind of equity through 
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The basic outcome of the application of laches is that a legal right or 
claim may not be enforced or allowed if an unreasonably long delay 
in asserting the right or claim has prejudiced the other party. 
Historically, there was a kind of connection between laches and 
statutes of limitation, possibly on the theory that the mere passage of 
enough delay in raising a claim of a mistake was sufficient for the 
court to render a negative ruling. However, they are not the same, and 
the court in the Western Energy case, while ruling on the basis of the 
statute of limitations, was also ruling that the discrepancy between the 
contract for deed and the warranty deed in that case was not enough to 
establish the existence of a mutual mistake. 
Laches is a defense that can be invoked when the 
plaintiff has delayed in bringing a suit. But laches is not 
concerned merely with the fact of delay. It matters why 
the plaintiff delayed bringing the claim and what effect 
that delay had on the defendant. In doctrinal terms, the 
delay must be “unreasonable” and cause “prejudice.” It 
is this focus on considerations other than the mere 
passage of time that strongly distinguishes laches from 
the statutes of limitations.36 
 
Accordingly, there is a significant distinction between statutes 
of limitation and the doctrine of laches when applied to a case such as 
Western Energy, as reflected in the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
opinion in the case, and in the following statement: 
 
“Laches, a term for slackness or negligence, used 
particularly in law to signify negligence on the part of 
a person in doing that which he is by law bound to do, 
in allowing an unreasonable time to elapse in asserting 
a right, seeking relief, or claiming a privilege. Statutes 
of limitation specify the time within which various 
 
the laxity with which they followed common law precedents.”). The chancellor, who 
was the judge presiding over the chancery court, was entitled to modify the 
application of strict legal rules and grant relief if that seemed appropriate in the 
particular circumstances. 
 36. Samuel L. Bray. A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella 
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. 2 (2014), citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs, 
LAW OF REMEDIES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 103 (2d ed. 2013). 
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classes of actions may be brought, and various statutes 
granting remedies, etc., impose a definite time within 
which legal action must be taken.37 
 
The concept of “equity” is mentioned a number of times 
above,38 though it is not feasible to attempt to discuss it in depth here. 
In a legal context, it suggests a system that recognizes that the law can 
work, to a limited extent anyway, with a reasonable amount of 
flexibility without damaging its authority. This was very well said 
nearly 100 years ago, with regard to property, by the great American 
legal scholar Roscoe Pound: 
 
More and more the tendency is to hold that what the 
law should secure is satisfaction of the owner’s 
reasonable wants with respect to the property—that is 
those which consist with the like wants of his neighbors 
and the interests of society.39 
 
 
 37. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 27. 
 38. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 22, 25, 31 and 32. 
 39. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 186 (1921). 
